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THE GOALS OF FDA REGULATION 
AND THE CHALLENGES OF      
MEETING THEM 
 
Ralph S. Tyler
†
 
 
The subject of this article is regulation, specifically regulation of 
products within the jurisdiction of the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).  My perspective is, of course, shaped by my 
former work as counsel to FDA. 
For students of administrative law and for lawyers practicing be-
fore administrative agencies, terms such as “administrative law” or 
“regulatory law” bring to mind legal doctrines such as delegation of 
legislative authority from Congress, for example, or statutory princi-
ples such as notice and comment rulemaking.  These doctrines and 
principles are certainly important to parties affected by agency ac-
tions, to counsel who practice before agencies, and to courts review-
ing agency actions.  I would argue, however, that these doctrines and 
principles provide very little insight into most of the substantive work 
in which regulatory agencies are engaged every day.  In addition, the-
se legal doctrines and principles do little to inform our ongoing na-
tional debate about the proper place of regulation in our economic 
system. 
Two fundamental questions must be addressed to understand and 
to evaluate the work of an administrative agency.  First, is there a 
need to regulate in a particular area?  And second, how should an 
agency operate to solve the problem which was the reason for deter-
mining that a need for regulation existed?  Obviously, one reaches the 
second question of “how to regulate” only if the answer to the first 
question is that there is a need or reason to regulate. 
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Why, then, do we have an FDA?  Put another way, do we need an 
FDA?  The predecessor of the modern FDA had its origins in response 
to Upton Sinclair’s classic novel, The Jungle, which was published in 
the early 1900’s.  The Jungle is remembered most often for its graphic 
depiction of the unsafe and insanitary conditions in the Chicago 
slaughterhouses of the time.  The novel is about much more than that, 
however.  The Jungle is the story of Jurgis Rudkis and his family, an 
immigrant family who are living a squalid, poverty-burdened exist-
ence in Chicago. This family is oppressed by all the institutional forc-
es with which they are forced to interact, including employers, land-
lords, and financial institutions.   
There is nothing subtle about the theme of The Jungle; the bluntly 
stated theme is that unchecked economic power acts in an oppressive 
fashion.  For Jurgis Rudkis and his family, there is seemingly no pro-
spect for relief from this oppression.  In the final third or so of the 
novel, however, Upton Sinclair gives his answer to how the crushing 
burdens of the Rudkis family and others like them will be relieved.  
For Upton Sinclair, speaking through Jurgis Rudkis, socialism is the 
answer. 
The Jungle had a huge impact.  The United States, starting with its 
then President, Theodore Roosevelt, took to heart the social and eco-
nomic problems which Upton Sinclair portrayed so effectively, but 
rejected Sinclair’s solution.  The American model -- the public policy 
response to The Jungle -- was not socialism, as Sinclair proposed, but 
the establishment of institutions of public power to balance, if not 
control, the major institutions of private power.  The United States 
Food and Drug Administration is perhaps the most prominent exam-
ple of this model. 
FDA exists because of the belief that without regulation -- mean-
ing governmentally established and enforced rules and standards -- 
life-essential goods such as safe food and safe and effective drugs and 
medical devices are less likely to be available.  I submit that this belief 
is rooted in fact.  Consumers lack the information and the ability to 
monitor the safety of the food supply chain once the world changes 
from a place where people grow their own food or obtain it from their 
neighbors to a world in which food is grown and packaged far from 
where it is consumed, now often in other countries.  Similarly, with 
respect drugs, there is no substitute for a well-controlled clinical trial 
to establish a drug’s safety and effectiveness and conducting such a 
trial is beyond the competence of individual consumers.  Consumers, 
unprotected by regulations requiring such trials, are unable to judge 
the safety and effectiveness of a drug.   
The alternative to regulation in the areas of food, drugs, and med-
ical devices is a marketplace flooded with products which carry no 
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greater assurance of safety, efficacy, and purity than the unverified 
and self-interested representations of those producing the products.  
Because of the risks inherent in that alternative, there is a strong con-
sensus in our country and, indeed, across much of the world that regu-
lation in the areas of food and medical products is necessary.   
There are many complaints about how FDA operates.  These 
complaints focus on the agency’s fairness, including the perception of 
some that it is too close to the industries it regulates, its effectiveness, 
its slowness, and the costs of compliance.  What is notable, however, 
is that few people, even FDA’s severest critics, suggest that consum-
ers would be protected adequately, let alone better protected, if there 
were no FDA and, instead, we had a system which permitted the unre-
stricted marketing, distribution, and sale of food and medical prod-
ucts.  This is because not many people believe that the marketplace 
alone or the marketplace supplemented by the civil tort system would 
police the marketplace sufficiently to assure a reasonable level of 
safety and protection.  The food and drug regulatory system has its 
weaknesses and most certainly it has its critics, but regulation in these 
areas is generally recognized as far preferable to no regulation. 
If the answer to the question of “why do we have an FDA?” is 
clear and widely accepted, the answer to the question of how FDA 
should operate is far less clear and is considerably more controversial.  
Even after a century of food and drug regulation, there is no consen-
sus in our country on many central questions.  These questions include 
how should FDA be organized to do its work most effectively; what 
resources FDA needs to meet its responsibilities; and what percentage 
of FDA’s funding should be general tax revenues and what percentage 
should be industry paid user fees.  And perhaps most significantly, in 
the medical products area, there is little agreement on the core policy 
question of how much risk FDA should tolerate when, for example, it 
reviews products to allow them onto the market or when FDA acts to 
remove approved products from the market. 
Since the adoption of the first version of the federal Food and 
Drug Act in 1906, Congress has enacted more than 200 laws related to 
the manufacture, distribution, and sale of food, health products, and 
most recently tobacco products. The agency, in turn, has adopted hun-
dreds of implementing regulations and issued many guidance docu-
ments.  Nevertheless, the regulatory framework is unsettled and there 
are now, as there have been in the past, demands in Congress and 
elsewhere to change the laws under which FDA operates. 
The medical device industry, for example, is vocal in expressing 
the view that FDA is too risk adverse, too slow, is a barrier to innova-
tion and job creation, and that the solution is removal of some of the 
regulators, or modification of the device approval process, or both.  
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Another example involves the issues of cost and access to medical 
products.  Cost is not part of FDA’s current statutory calculus.  When 
escalating health care costs are one of the greatest challenges facing 
our country, a fair question is whether it makes sense to divorce drug 
and device approval decisions from questions of their cost and access 
to these products. 
There are also questions about whether the agency’s method of 
regulating is the most effective use of its limited resources.  For many 
years, rulemaking has been the agency’s overwhelmingly dominant 
mode of regulation.  A preference for rules over adjudication is per-
haps inevitable given that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is not a 
model of clarity, an inevitable consequence of numerous legislative 
compromises and piecemeal enactments.  In addition, the sweep of 
FDA’s regulatory reach favors rulemaking over adjudication.  The oft 
cited figure is that FDA regulates 20-25% of the US economy.  It is 
not practical and it is potentially unfair to regulate that much activity 
one case at a time via adjudication.   
The question remains, however, whether FDA has been too rule 
reliant and failed to bring a sufficient number of enforcement cases to 
make its rules credible. Over the years, while FDA’s responsibilities 
have grown and the number of FDA regulated products has increased 
while the level of enforcement activity has declined.  In 1975, for ex-
ample, the agency brought 435 seizure actions (those being actions to 
seize unsafe or insanitary food or health products) and 29 injunction 
cases (cases against firms to stop unsafe or insanitary manufacturing, 
production, or distribution practices).  Twenty years later in 1995, the 
numbers were 73 seizures and 8 injunctions; by 2008, it was 8 sei-
zures and 5 injunctions.  There has been an increase in the level of 
enforcement activity in the past couple of years, but the level of en-
forcement activity is still quite modest as an absolute matter and is 
particularly so when compared to the agency’s overall regulatory out-
put and the number of firms subject to its jurisdiction. 
FDA was conceived, structured, and has operated as a domestic 
regulatory agency, on the assumption that it could do its job by regu-
lating industries making or growing products in the United States.  
The world has changed, however, and the marketplace of FDA regu-
lated products is now global.  In 2011, nearly 24 million shipments of 
FDA regulated products, food, medical devices, drugs, cosmetics, 
radiation emitting devices, and tobacco products, will arrive at US 
ports of entry.  These millions of shipments come from more than 150 
countries, from more than 300,000 facilities, and involve 130,000 
importers of record.  Imports of FDA regulated products have quadru-
pled over the past decade.   
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Our nation’s heavy reliance on imported food, medical products, 
and other FDA regulated products poses new public health risks and 
requires major changes in how regulation is conducted.  When, for 
example, we experience an outbreak of food-caused deaths or illness 
in the United States, as occurred not long ago with cantaloupes, trac-
ing the outbreak back to its root cause is essential to limit exposure 
and to prevent recurrence.  This trace back task is difficult enough 
when the product is produced domestically.  The problem becomes 
considerably more complex, but no less important, when the potential 
source of the offending product is a farm or processing facility on the 
other side of the world. 
Increasingly, active pharmaceutical ingredients and components 
of medical devices are manufactured outside the United States.  A 
central tenet of FDA’s regulatory regime is that these products are to 
be manufactured in accordance with current good manufacturing prac-
tices.  The rules governing these practices require that a manufacturer 
has control over its manufacturing processes and is able to document 
that control.  FDA’s ability to enforce these rules through inspection 
of non-US facilities is limited.  Imported products also pose risks 
from economically motivated intentional adulteration or counterfeit-
ing.  This has occurred with pharmaceuticals, human food, and pet 
food. 
American consumers do not have one standard for domestic prod-
ucts and another standard for imported products.  The American peo-
ple expect their food to be safe and their medical products to be safe 
and effective irrespective of the product’s country of origin.  FDA’s 
challenge, therefore, is how to meet that expectation in a world in 
which increasingly these regulated products are imported from other 
countries.  The realistic options are limited.     
Scale and resources make it impractical to inspect with regularity 
all the non-US production facilities, farms, and manufacturing facili-
ties producing for the US market.  There are also serious limitations to 
using inspections at the border as the principal means of identifying 
unsafe or otherwise violative products.  These limitations include the 
mismatch between inspection resources and the volume of imports 
and the need for expedited review of many products to avoid spoilage. 
Necessity dictates that importers be responsible for assuring the 
integrity of their products.  The framework has to be that those bring-
ing products into this country are responsible for ensuring that their 
products are produced, packaged, and transported in accordance with 
science-based, prevention-based standards.  The agency’s regulatory 
responsibility is to articulate clear standards, while industry bears the 
burden and the responsibility of compliance.  The Food Safety Mod-
ernization Act, which became law in January 2011, reflects this ap-
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proach.  The Act requires that each importer of food “perform risk-
based foreign supplier verification activities,” the nature of which 
FDA is to define by regulations.   
The global supply chain of regulated products means that FDA 
will increasingly need to rely on the regulatory regimes of the coun-
tries in which products originate and the countries through which 
products pass enroute to the United States.  This need to rely on the 
regulatory regimes of other countries is a cause for concern, but is 
unavoidable.  The new food safety law requires FDA to develop with-
in two years “a comprehensive plan to expand the technical, scientific, 
and regulatory food safety capacity of foreign governments, and their 
respective food industries, from which foods are exported to the Unit-
ed States.”  That is a tall order.  Moreover, this is a task which must 
be approached with humility because no one can legitimately claim 
that the food safety system in the U.S. is free of weaknesses.   
The case for strengthening regulatory regimes in other countries 
must be made on the ground that it is good for the exporting country.  
Exporting countries have a strong brand interest in having US con-
sumers trust the safety of their products.  That trust will grow and be 
maintained by developing the regulatory regimes of those countries.  
The force of this argument is undercut, however, by competing de-
mands for scarce public resources.  Again, this is as true in the United 
States as it is elsewhere.  The United States Congress is far more like-
ly to give FDA new regulatory responsibilities than it is to give FDA 
additional budget resources to meet those responsibilities.   
As I believe these various examples illustrate, FDA faces the ten-
sion of the difference between the strong consensus around the ques-
tion of the need for FDA and the lack of a consensus around the ques-
tions of how FDA should operate and what it should do to meet that 
agreed-to need.  The gap between these two is not a trivial matter.   
In the end, governing and regulating are not primarily about vi-
sion or theory; they are about execution; they involve managing com-
plex organizations comprised of a large number of people of varying 
backgrounds and skills and having them perform day in and day out to 
solve tough problems like assuring the safety of the food supply and 
assuring that safe and effective drugs and medical devices get to the 
market while preventing unsafe and ineffective ones from reaching 
the market.  Successful execution of these important and difficult 
tasks virtually presupposes agreement about how what needs to be 
done is done.  The absence of agreement regarding the “how” of regu-
lation inevitably diminishes regulatory effectiveness.    
We in this country are not alone in our concern about the effec-
tiveness of our administrative agencies.  I had the opportunity to visit 
Beijing and Shanghai on behalf of FDA.  In Beijing, I met with a 
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group of faculty and graduate students at Peking University Law 
School for a discussion about FDA and food and drug regulatory is-
sues more generally.  A young woman in the group asked the percep-
tive question of “how do you know if an administrative agency is ac-
tually making a difference?”  This is a question which is not asked as 
frequently as it should be.  How, then, does one know?   
The starting point must be for an agency to articulate clearly what 
constitutes success.  If an agency does not begin by defining success, 
it can never be said to have failed or succeeded because no one, in-
cluding the agency, knows what constitutes success or failure.  To be 
meaningful, an agency needs to define success with precision.  An 
amorphous goal such as protecting the public health is too general a 
definition of success to be meaningful because it is not measurable.  
Specific public health metrics must be identified so progress against 
those metrics can be measured.   
Consider, for example, FDA’s new responsibility to regulate, but 
not outlaw, tobacco products.  The Center for Disease Control esti-
mates that 46 million adult Americans smoke.  An enormous amount 
of data has been accumulated over many years confirming the health 
risks and costs of smoking.  These data show that smoking is the larg-
est cause of preventable deaths in our country, and that there are 
enormous costs associated with treating people with smoking caused 
illnesses.  The public health case for reducing the number of smokers 
is stated rather easily:  reducing the number of smokers will prevent 
premature deaths; it will improve the health of those who quit or never 
start; and it will result in lower costs for the health care system over-
all. 
As an example of what FDA is to do by way of regulating while 
not outlawing tobacco products, Congress directed FDA to promul-
gate a rule requiring cigarette manufacturers to put graphic images on 
cigarette packages depicting the health risks of smoking.  The ra-
tionale of the proposed warnings is that having graphic images on 
cigarette packages will affect behavior by discouraging people from 
starting to smoke and encouraging current smokers to quit. Predicta-
bly, the tobacco industry has challenged these warnings on First 
Amendment and other grounds and, as of this writing, the courts have 
enjoined the implementation of the warnings.  Assuming the warnings 
are upheld and ultimately implemented, the proof of whether the im-
ages make a difference is whether the number of smokers declines.  
That is, after all, the point of the warnings and, indeed, is the point of 
FDA’s having jurisdiction over tobacco products.  The purpose of 
regulation is to make a difference, not to add to the volume of legally 
valid regulations.  Promulgating regulations is only a means, not an 
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end, and it is certainly not the reason Congress gave FDA regulatory 
authority over tobacco. 
Food safety is another example.  CDC publishes data on food re-
lated illnesses and deaths of which there are approximately 3,000 in 
the United States each year.  A relevant measure of the effectiveness 
of the FDA’s increased regulatory activity in the food safety area is 
whether those numbers, adjusted for changes in population, decline. 
Fairness requires recognizing that there are complexities associat-
ed with assessing accurately FDA’s effectiveness.  A critical part of 
FDA’s work involves acting to prevent bad things from happening.  
The most famous example of this is FDA’s failure to approve the drug 
thalidomide when the drug was approved in Europe.  FDA’s failure to 
follow Europe’s lead prevented untold numbers of American children 
from being born with serious birth defects.  Success here meant inju-
ries were avoided because a product was not approved, a type of regu-
latory success which is difficult to measure. 
Nevertheless, and recognizing the difficulties, those who believe 
in the importance of regulation as an essential tool in protecting con-
sumers by preventing those with market power from abusing that 
power, and I count myself in that group, must take seriously the task 
of setting and transparently disclosing objective metrics against which 
regulatory performance can be judged.  There is great truth to the 
statement that “if it is not measured, it won’t get done.”  That state-
ment applies to the wide spectrum of administrative agencies, from an 
agency responsible for food and drug safety to one responsible for 
filling pot holes. 
FDA has made a start in this area.  FDA publishes on its FDA 
Track website data for the various offices and centers so the public 
can see what the agency says it is going to do, what its goals are, and 
how the agency is performing against those goals.  This effort is only 
a start, however, because the data tracked currently focuses on things 
like timely completion of regulatory or administrative actions, as dis-
tinguished from measuring the agency’s performance in accomplish-
ing its major public health objectives of, for example, reducing the 
number of smokers, or reducing the number of food related illnesses, 
or reducing the obesity epidemic which plagues our nation.  FDA’s 
timely accomplishment of its smaller regulatory tasks is not unim-
portant, but, in all fairness, those tasks are not the reason Congress 
created and funds FDA, nor are these smaller tasks of much interest to 
the American public. 
The most basic principles of administrative law hold that adminis-
trative agencies are required to comply with the statutes pursuant to 
which they are authorized and agencies are bound to comply with 
their own rules.  In other words, an agency must not violate the law.  
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While that much is to be expected, it is not sufficient.  The law’s 
equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath’s “first, do no harm” is not a rea-
son to create an administrative agency nor does it provide a rational 
basis for evaluating an agency’s performance.   
In the century since The Jungle was published, there has been a 
proliferation of regulatory agencies at all levels of government in the 
United States.  Despite this, we know too little about how well these 
agencies actually perform. We need to demand greater clarity of 
agencies in stating how their performance is to be judged and more 
data about how, in fact, agencies are performing against those stated 
criteria. 
FDA operates in the sensitive space of public health, balancing 
safety, risk, and benefit, and often it must make decisions based on 
imperfect or incomplete information.  FDA will always be the subject 
of substantial criticism, some fair and some not.  Unfair criticisms are 
best answered and the larger case for regulation is made most effec-
tively by FDA’s articulating clearly the criteria against which agency 
performance should be judged and disclosing in real time actual agen-
cy performance data.  The need for an effective FDA is every bit as 
great now as it was at the time of The Jungle and, arguably, the task of 
protecting Americans is more complicated now than it was then.   
Disparaging government is currently highly fashionable in our 
country.  We should be cautious about this tendency and remember 
that we need our governmental institutions and we need them to work.  
The wholesale trashing of public institutions and those who work to 
maintain those institutions weakens the institutions, and thereby 
weakens their ability to protect the public.  We need to return to a 
time when public service is honored, respected and, yes, encouraged. 
The active debates in this country about regulation are close to the 
core of our never ending national debate about the proper role of gov-
ernment, including the role of the federal government as compared to 
that of state and local governments.  Demonstrated agency perfor-
mance will increase public support for the critically important work 
which administrative agencies, like FDA, do and ultimately provides 
the best answer to the question of why we need these agencies and, 
indeed, why we need an effective government. 
    
